Arsenal’s financial position from 2022/23 to 2024/25

This financial analysis has been prepared by former AST Board member Simon Hill

The following table sets out a snapshot look at the figures for the financial years to 31 May 2023 (season 2022/23), 31 May 2024 (season 2023/24) and 31 May 2025 (season 2024/25). These are actual figures as reported in Arsenal’s report and accounts posted at Companies House.

The figures illustrate the transformative impact European football has on the club’s ability to invest in the team as Arsenal went from Europa League participation in 2022/23 to Champions League participation in 2023/24 and 2024/25.

This helped fuel the phenomenal growth of 50% in revenues. However, this is matched by similar size increases in football costs (wage bill and other football costs). 

The result is that Arsenal continually report losses and as this analysis explains can expect a very big loss for season 25/26.

*Cash generated toward player trading is a simplified description of the amount we see Arsenal generating for expenditure on players and fixed assets.

Introduction – the increasing difficulty in analysing the figures

The club’s report and accounts are increasingly tight lipped about the precise reasons for commercial revenue and cost increases.  Open source material like transfermarkt and sportrac provide (unverified) data on player trading and wages and writers like Swiss Ramble provide helpful analysis on broadcast revenues, but getting behind the commercial revenue and other football cost lines is increasingly difficult. 

The UEFA club report (The European Club Finance and Investment Landscape – February 2026) provides some insights on retail and merchandise sales but much of the open source material out there is based on rumour so it is becoming increasingly difficult to prepare estimates and explanations for all the changes in the figures. 

Matchday revenues

Season 2023/24 saw dramatic growth in matchday revenues of 30%, arising from a run into the Quarter final stages of the Champions League, an FA Cup home game against Liverpool, improved Arsenal Women ticket sales and a ticket price increase averaging 5%. 

In season 2024/25, the growth continued thanks to a Champions League Semi-Final, the newly expanded Champions League qualifying format (one extra group game), another 5% ticket price rise plus a lot more Arsenal Women fixtures from their Champions League run and three more League Cup games.

In terms of games staged at the Emirates Stadium, 2024/25 represents about as good a season as you can get, with revenues reaching a staggering £154m. Going forward there is downside risk of these falling back if cup success isn’t sustained, which is no doubt one reason why a 5% annual price rise, imposed again for the 2026/27 season, seems embedded.

Broadcast revenues

Broadcast revenues continue to grow. In 2024 there was a further substantial rise from reaching the quarter finals of the Champions League and second place in the Premier League. 2025’s identical finishing position in the Premier League and CL semi-final gave another substantial boost. The Champions League accounted for £99m of TV revenue – 35% of the total 278m TV revenue received.

Looking ahead, the Premier League TV deal is delivering only inflationary increases (and that in return for more televised games) with future growth seemingly now dependent mainly on the international/US market and UEFA’s new Champions League contract. In short, the potential for dramatic broadcast growth has topped out and it is performance that is key, in particular qualifying for the Champions League.

The Club World Cup looks set to add a new significant layer of revenue for Europe’s top teams. Chelsea enjoyed a reported £90m bonus from winning the inaugural championships in summer 2025 (appearance money alone is reported as £30m), as much as Arsenal’s run to the semi-final of the Champions League generated. This is sobering stuff and will just add to clubs like Real Madrid and PSG’s financial domination. 

 Commercial and Retail revenues

Commercial income increased by £49m in 2023/24 and £50m in 2024/25. What stands behind the increases is difficult to assess as sponsorship contract details are kept confidential, but there has been a considerable expansion of the club’s retail and merchandising operations and we believe 50% of the increase stems from this source.

The UEFA club financial report for 2024/25 refers to £130m of retail sales in the year – an increase of £25m or 27%. This is also referenced in the club’s accounts and follows big increases the year before. In part, this follows changes in the way clubs now manage branded merchandise and clothing, with gross sales going through the books rather than just the net margin. This arrangement helps clubs like Arsenal comply with wage-to-turnover controls set by UEFA (70%) and the Premier League (85%).

It was anticipated that the new Sobha training complex naming rights deal and early extensions of the Emirates and Adidas deals in 2023 and 2022 were adding up to £10m and £15m pa respectively. The original Addidas deal expired in summer 2024 so it seems circa £15m of the £25m likely increase in sponsorships in 2024/25 came from this source, with the rest split between Sobha and secondary deals.

A new shirt sleeve deal with the HR payroll firm Deel will kick in for 2026/27 with an expected financial uplift replacing the contentious Visit Rwanda branding, and numerous secondary deals have been announced so further increases in commercial revenue can be expected.

The phenomenal growth in commercial and administrative headcount (an extra 62 people in 2022/23, an extra 87 people in 2023/24 and an extra 51 in 2024/25) to 564 people in total is primarily aimed at serving and boosting partnership income. This is a lot of cost so the club must be anticipating further substantial growth in commercial revenues. This is to be expected, as there is still a long way to go to match the levels of Liverpool (£323m in 2025/26, which was £60m more than Arsenal).

Wages

As revenues improved from a return to European football and better commercial deals, so upgrading the squad has become an annual event. 

The churn in Arsenal’s squad over the past four summer transfer windows has been considerable. There are no more quiet summers with Arteta and first Edu and now Berta running the ship.

In summer 2024, the club cleared a lot of players. They sold Smith-Rowe, Nketiah and Ramsdale. Soares and Elneny saw their contracts end and Nelson, Vieira, Lokonga and Tavares were loaned out. 

The club recruited Calafiori, Merino, Neto and Sterling, gave new contracts to Arteta and White, endured an increase in employers’ national insurance and saw continued growth in the women’s team all of which caused a £19m increase in wages to £347m.

Summer 2025 saw Tierney, Partey and Jorginho’s contracts expire, Sterling and Neto’s loans end, Lokonga and Tavares finally sold, and Zinchenko, Vieira, Kiwior and Nelson all going out on loan. Tomiyasu’s contract was cancelled

The club then recruited Zubemendi, Gyokeres, Madueke, Mosquera, Kepa, Eze, Norgaard and Hincapie, so 12 players out and 8 in.

That churn has been backed by massive new contracts for the team’s perceived stars – the likes of Saka, Martinelli, Odegaard, Gabriel and Saliba plus the marquee signings of Declan Rice and Kai Havertz – in an attempt to build a dominant squad.

All of this has resulted in an eye-watering increase in salaries and appearance fees (Champions League appearance bonuses) up £93m to £328m. Since then we have seen new contracts awarded to Saliba and Gabriel, with Saka also signing an extension in February 2026.

All told, the net impact is expected to be around a further £20m more on the wage bill for season 2025/26 taking it to £370m in total.

Last year I wrote that it was hard to see any further significant expansion of the wage bill as the revenue growth just wouldn’t be there to support it. Whilst player trading did deliver significant profits (£82m) in 2024/25, recent history shows that the club’s player trading could not be relied on to deliver significant profits, and this was the case again in summer 2025.

Looking ahead to next year’s results we see further wage bill increases, reduced player trading, and additional player amortisation charges (see below) having a material impact on next year’s P&L, meaning a substantial loss of approximately £100m is expected to be reported.

Amortisation

This is the write down of the value of the playing pool including agents’ fees on new contracts for existing players and add on costs triggered by appearance fees, qualification bonuses for the Champions League etc (provisions for agent fees on new contracts make up a considerable portion of recent cost). Interestingly, deferred payments are discounted by a notional interest charge that is taken to profit and loss as a finance cost.

Arsenal added aggressively to the playing pool in 2022/23 (a net £125m increase to £774m) and added a net £110m in 2023/24 increasing the historic cost of the playing pool to £882m. This pushed up the amortisation charge to £172m in 2023/24.

In 2024/25 there was something of a pause in the levels of investment with only a net £44m added to the playing pool and no change in the amortisation charge, but special impairment provisions (probably against Zinchenko and Tommyasu). This added another £15m and in effect represents the bringing forward of a chunk of 2025/26’s costs.

Value of Arsenal’s player pool in recent seasons:

The increase in amortisation charges from £117m in 2020/21 reflects a phenomenal investment in the playing squad over the past four seasons (close on £800m) and a considerable clearing out of some equally expensive players (close on £450m at cost). Think Lacazette, Pepe and Aubameyang gone and Jesus, Rice and Havertz added with a strong supporting cast of £30m-plus players alongside.

In 2025/26 this stands to go even further with over £150m added to the playing pool taking it up to over £1billion (a number I never thought I’d get to mention!). There is no doubt the club will hope to see this stabilise or fall in summer 2026 with substantial cost tied up in unwanted players like Jesus, Vieira and Kiwior (over £100m including fees) but have already committed to the purchase of Hincapie on deferred terms (at a reported cost of £45m). So I think it is fair to say £1bn is the new squad cost normal. This player pool cost would be even higher if it weren’t for the likes of players like Saka who came via the academy and longer-term club players like Saliba, Gabriel and Martinelli.

Other football costs

These include match staging costs, travel, retail costs of sale, costs related to commitments under sponsorship agreements, medical costs and all the usual types of overhead present in any substantial organisation (like insurance and legal fees).

These remain a challenge to know what is in them, what moves them and why they have changed season by season. They fell by a staggering £32m in 2020/21 to £47m when games were played without spectators in attendance due to COVID. They were still down below trend in 2021/22 at £75m when there were no European games played and no touring.

With the return of European football in 2022/23, logic suggested they would return toward 2018/19 levels (£86m) plus a big chunk for inflation in travel costs, energy costs (100%), hosting extra women’s games, matchday staff wage increases, increased squad insurance etc, but they came in significantly higher than expected at £112m (20% higher) without any real explanation given.

We speculated that a large chunk of the unexpected increase (circa £15m) was down to the change in retail and merchandising strategy and represented additional costs of merchandise and distribution costs, as referenced by the UEFA report which cited substantial retail growth. 

In 2023/24 they shot up another £34m (30%) to £146m, almost double their level two seasons before, and then another £54m (36%) in 2024/25. We can see retail cost of sales provided only a tiny amount of this increase (£3m) and with only 5 more games played at the Emirates Stadium at an underlying level it remains a  mystery, but is likely due to the non-stock costs of selling shirts and merchandise (staff costs, warehousing, distribution fees etc). 

Arsenal’s “other football cost” bill is 10% higher than Liverpool’s but 10% less than Spurs who have a lot of hospitality costs and other events. Given Liverpool have much higher commercial revenues overall but similar retail and merchandising sales it perhaps reflects a London weighting and higher ground running costs.

Player trading

Player trading has become the release valve for clubs who are over spending relative to their on-pitch performance and related revenue streams. Witness Chelsea and Aston Villa’s extreme behaviour last summer, arguably manufacturing profit so they met the rules.

There is a valid argument that Arsenal need the academy to deliver players who can be sold, adding to regular profits in the way Manchester City, Liverpool and Chelsea’s academies have, to provide wiggle room for higher investment.

For the past two summers that has been the case with Balogun, Xhaka and several Academy players providing the £51m in sales reported for 2023/24 and  Smith-Rowe, Nketiah and a handful of other academy players delivering £82m in 2024/25.

Somewhat catastrophically, no real profits were generated in summer 2025 for the 2025/26 season, whilst the club effectively spent double what it might normally spend in a huge push to build a winning squad. This has put the P&L on an unsustainable path unless there is significant right-sizing of the playing squad in summer 2026.

Finance costs (depreciation)

Increased borrowing from KSE and more regular and heavy use of the overdraft facility were expected to have a significant impact on finance costs. At a headline level they are now a significant item at £18m pa, comprised of KSE interest, overdraft interest (Barclays) and the notional interest on the future player transfer instalments.

One would imagine the main driver is KSE’s debt (now £340m up from £324m). However, interest costs on KSE debt equated to only around 3% in 2024/25. 

One additional item is now an interest charge in the accounts of £4m for the notional benefit of having deferred payment terms for player purchases (over £100m is due over one year on such terms).

Cash flow

Given the recent history of losses (almost £300m over 5 years) and massive investment in the playing squad, it is hardly surprising that Arsenal have had to draw increasingly on loans from KSE.

Remember, KSE paid out the remaining original stadium debt early in 2020/21 (£220m including interest rate break costs) to generate more financial freedom in the running of the club. In 2023/24 their loans to the club increased by a net £65m to £324m and then a further £16m in 2024-25. This is a loan with a two-year notice period for repayment, notice which had not been given as at 31 May 2025.

Prima facie, after allowing for the impact of new player acquisitions on 2025/26 figures, removing the benefit of player sales in 2024/25 and the run to the Champions League semi-final there is a prospective £100m loss in 2025/26, even with progress deep into the Champions League knock out phases.

In summer 2025, a net £268m was spent on new players and whilst most of that may be financed by increased transfer debts it seems likely KSE will have to provide more funding (loans) as there is already £100m net due to be paid out on past player transfers and it is unlikely operating cash flows will exceed £100m leaving nothing to go toward immediate payments due on the £268m of players purchased.  A broad estimate of the cash needed to fund initial instalments would be £65-£100m and KSE would probably have funded this amount.

Overall picture

In summer 2024, there was clearly scope to invest in more playing talent but obviously the right player could not be found and Sterling came in late as a high-earning loan signing. What transpired in the season run-in with injuries was obviously disappointing to not only us as fans but no doubt to the players and management team, and a huge summer of spending was sanctioned to fix the perceived problem of a small squad. In doing so, the club will incur a huge loss and wipe out nearly all its reserves come May 2026.

Further financial support from KSE is on the cards and departures from the squad will be required in summer 2026 to get the finances on an even keel.

When the club talks about self-sustainability it is really trying to say the level of cash generated should be sufficient to keep a winning team (ie fund net transfers) but it has fallen short of that target.

Wider sentiment

In his review of last season Swiss Ramble explains in detail how Arsenal’s finances have transformed in the past 5 seasons from a position of annual profitability to one of persistent loss with the debt profile increasing.

Obviously Covid had an impact but repeatedly missing out on Champions League football and the squandering of a lot of money on players who failed to deliver were the  main drivers.

The owner faced with a “put up or sell up” situation in 2021 decided to “put up” and has transformed Arsenal from the self-sustaining Bank of England club to another owner-funded highly-geared Premier League club.  

The owner has backed the management team tremendously, spending £1bn (gross) on new signings and providing generous new contracts to the young core of the team over the past few seasons. But it is telling that in a season where the club achieved a lot on the pitch and made £82m selling players it still only racked up a £17m operating profit.

In fairness, the game has become ever more competitive and owner-backed investment has expanded competition for those coveted CL spots and even the secondary Europa League spots to eight or more teams. It is a high stakes game, where costly errors in the transfer market, underperformance on the pitch and a failing academy can threaten a drop down a level or two (witness the recent carnage at Man United).

The role of sporting director has become as pivotal to a club’s success as first team and academy management. In Andrea Berta, Arsenal has committed to paying big money to a well-regarded operator.

UEFA and the Premier League seem to have the stomach to enforce their new cost control rules and even though the punishments are relatively mild we are seeing clubs take dramatic action to right their finances (eg Newcastle, Aston Villa, Chelsea and Manchester United). We are also seeing some creative accounting and unusual transactions to find ways to dodge the rules, and something of a cat and mouse game between UEFA and some clubs (notably Chelsea) to plug loopholes. They are trying to bring some restraint to club spending and that sanity is much required in an environment where state-backed and billionaire ownership is increasingly dominating. 

That said, the Club World Cup – next due to be held in 2029 – threatens to lock in top club dominance.

In this regard, it is no wonder rules over what constitutes fair levels of commercial income from related parties and sustainable losses are being challenged by “honest” clubs like Arsenal, though sadly it seems UEFA and the Premier League do not have the stomach or financial firepower to really come down hard on this.